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The paper discusses similarities and differences between past EU binding 
internal liberalization „across the board“ in the industrial sector and present 
so-called voluntary sectoral liberalization of member states of the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC). While both approaches are second-best 
compared to unconcerted unilateral liberalization, the major disadvantage of 
liberalization APEC style in the industrial sector consists in introducing 
distortions between sectors as well as between member states due to rising 
disparities in timing liberalization within Asia Pacific. Such disparities raise 
problems of time consistency of liberalization under the so-called Bogor target 
of achieving free trade within APEC in 2010 (2020 for less advanced member 
states). Reliance on „peer pressure“ as the only mechanism to commit member 
states to liberalization is seen as a weak driving force to make APEC’s 
concerted unilateralism a stepping stone for the successor round of the Uruguay 
Round. The paper proposes a number of measures successfully applied in the 
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I.  Who Plays the Music Determines the Tone: APEC’s Medley versus 
EU’s March 
APEC and the EU have often been described as two very different approaches to 
regional integration. To specify the familiar label attached to APEC, that is 
„open regionalism“, Garnaut [1996] defines APEC as ‘concerted unilateral MFN 
liberalization of trade by a number of states’. The EU way of forming a free 
trade area, customs union, common market and economic union in a stepwise 
approach can then be labeled ‘concerted plurilateral non-MFN-(discriminatory) 
liberalization by a specified number of club members’.  
  These descriptions do not necessarily preclude that APEC’s regionalism is 
effective and that EU’s regionalism is closed. APEC’s approach could become 
redundant if a critical mass of countries prepared to liberalize concertedly does 
not exist or if countries from the very beginning prefer to transfer the APEC 
approach to the WTO multilateral trade negotiations. Furthermore, nobody 
prevents a country whether or not it is located in the APEC area from 
liberalizing unilaterally without waiting for neighbors to join. On the other hand, 
the EU way to regional integration must not be „closed“ per se and in fact was 
not closed except for the agricultural sector. There is unanimous evidence from a 
number of empirical studies, showing that since 1957 the EU preference margin 
declined substantially especially in recent years since parallel to the removal of 
trade barriers within the Community trade barriers with the rest of the world in 
the industrial sector were dismantled as well [Sapir, 1992; WTO, 1995]. It was 
the WTO Secretariat itself which attributed part of the success of the post-war 
worldwide liberalization to the process of regional integration in Europe moving 
on a parallel track of internal and external dismantling of trade barriers. Yet, two   2 
important qualifications are necessary. Between EU internal and external 
liberalization there was no fixed link which would have committed the Union to 
automatically lower external trade barriers when lowering internal barriers. 
Second, external liberalization on a club basis may have proceeded more slowly 
for individual member states than if the member states had the sovereignty to 
liberalize unilaterally. For some other member states, it might have been the 
other way round: regional discipline forced them to liberalize more rapidly vis-
à-vis non-member states than if they had the chance to decide on their own. The 
net result of the two conflicting positions within the European Union is not easy 
to specify because of the counterfactual and because of the special situation of 
the agricultural sector. Hence, at least for the manufacturing sector one can 
argue that the group of „liberal“ traders within the Union had sufficient weight 
(and financial means) to induce the „less liberal“ members to liberalize more 
than under the national scenario. This advantage seems higher than the uncertain 
loss of options for the more liberal countries to liberalize more under the 
national scenario. For instance, it is unlikely that Germany would have 
liberalized more had it stood alone compared to what the country was prepared 
to liberalize concertedly with the other members. 
  Ultimately, both approaches are concerted in the sense that member states 
of the two schemes share common targets such as trade liberalization, both 
within the region and outside. Each member state in the respective region is 
prepared to liberalize provided that others join him. Hence, the reciprocity 
element in concerted liberalization is also common to both the EU and APEC. 
But it is here where the common elements seem to end.  
  The major difference between the EU and APEC is the way they play the 
theme called liberalization. For musicians, APEC is like playing a simple 
medley in an orchestra of talented musicians who find together because 
everybody enjoys music on his own. Beyond music, they do not share other   3 
common interests. Admission to the orchestra is largely free (except from the 
prerequisite that musicians in the early stage should come from a specific 
geographic quarter). At a later stage, everybody is invited to join the orchestra. 
Given its open nature, admission to APEC basically requires the ability and the 
will to play an instrument and it is up to the choice of the individual member of 
the orchestra which instrument he wants to play. The way the orchestra finds its 
harmony is simply by playing the medley and by playing to improve quality 
through benchmarking, that is taking the best player as a reference. APEC calls 
this benchmarking peer pressure. 
  In contrast, the EU needs a much tougher approach. What they play is a 
march with an exact rhythm and time because it is only this type of music which 
is believed to guarantee discipline and to prevent the members of the orchestra 
from falling back to old times of dissent and dispute. The march is a means to 
prepare for the ultimate stages of discipline and convergence, that is playing „a 
capella“ in a family. To beat time, a conductor is needed who, on the one hand, 
has its own vested interests and, on the other hand, can be controlled by the 
orchestra through exerting group discipline. 
  In economic terms, a conductor of the EU orchestra means implicit 
economic leadership. Post-war trade policy history has shown Germany in the 
industrial sector to exert economic leadership by urging for internal and external 
liberalization and by persuading other member states to follow suit. Such 
persuasion was by no means costless. It comprised payments for the various 
structural and regional funds, decoupling of the agricultural sector from external 
liberalization, shouldering a major part of financial burden of subsidizing 
agriculture (with some selfish interests to continue subsidizing its agricultural 
sector), assuming the role of the anchor currency and surrendering sovereignty 
over trade policies (and other policies) to Brussels. Instead of peer pressure 
APEC style, „do et des“ bargaining EU style had to be pursued until discipline   4 
in the orchestra was such that the march could be played. Such bargaining has 
become legalized in contractual form from the very beginning, but with 
ascending order of commitments. Today, the type of music the EU plays is still 
the march but increasingly sophisticated pieces are played. New members are 
therefore coached outside the orchestra in a preparatory room before they are 
allowed to join. Leaving the orchestra is not taken into consideration as the 
revenues of the orchestra are sizable especially for newcomers who can benefit 
from its long-standing reputation. In a music contest, bringing the two orchestras 
together, precision and loudness of the EU march audibly dominates the 
elegance and innovativeness of the APEC medley which is still looking for 
making itself perceptible. Whatever we know about APEC, is that the medley 
will not offend the ears of the audience while the EU march is sometimes said to 
do so. Yet, there is also a big drummer in the APEC orchestra who outside the 
orchestra can easily play a similar sound if the EU march should be found 
unduly loud and aggressive.  
  The question to be tackled in the following is whether the young APEC 
orchestra can take some lessons from the old and experienced EU orchestra and 
whether this would yield a good harvest for APEC. Before taking lessons, 
however, it is essential not to suppress what the two regions have shared in 
contributing to expanding world trade and to commit themselves in their 
discipline vis-à-vis the world trading order and what they share in terms of 
challenges (Chapter II). Departing from common strengths and challenges, 
Chapter III highlights the essential differences in orchestrating trade 
liberalization and their underlying economic and political underpinnings. 
Chapter IV stylizes major elements of the framework under APEC which APEC 
operates (since the Bogor targets) and their possible implications and constraints 
as seen from a European perspective. Chapter V departs from the findings 
derived from Chapter IV and proposes elements of the EU liberalization which   5 
could accelerate the APEC process without changing  its nature. Chapter VI 
concludes on the results. 
II.  APEC and EU: Common Strengths and Challenges 
1. Strengths 
a.  Contributing to world trade expansion without trade diversion  
APEC and the EU comprise the leading trading partners in the world. Member 
states of the two groupings have absorbed about 82 per cent of world imports 
and 85 per cent of world exports along a rising trend in the mid-nineties. 
Distinguishing between intra-area and extra-area trade provides hints for the 
potential of further trade expansion either replacing domestic production (trade 
creation) or substituting for trade from non-area trading partners (trade 
diversion). 
  If for reasons of simplicity APEC is confined to the three sub-groups 
developing Asia (including China), Japan and the US thus disregarding 
Australia/New Zealand, Canada and the Latin American member states, it 
becomes evident that the rising share of APEC in world trade (from 37 per cent 
in world imports 1990 to 44 per cent in 1995) was mainly carried through by 
higher growth of intra-area trade than extra-area trade (Table 1). As a result, the 
share of intra-area exports in total exports of the three core sub-groups rose from 
64 to 69 per cent within the first half of the nineties with overproportionate 
growth in Japan and lower growth in the US. For both developing Asia and 
Japan, APEC trading partners absorbed three quarters of their total exports in 
1995. In contrast, the EU intra-area trade share (comprising EU 15) slightly 
declined by 4 percentage points for two reasons. First, acceding new members 
had lower intra-EU trade shares than the old members and secondly, rapidly 
growing economies expanding their import demand were outside the EU. The 
latter reason seems more important.   6 
Table 1 – Share of Intra-Areaa Exports in Total Exports 
 Sub-group  1990  1995 






 Japan  68  75 
 US  51  54 






EU 15    66  62 
aAreas are defined as APEC and EU respectively. 
Source: UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, current issues. 
  This rough breakdown bears two interesting implications. First, trade 
expansion between rapidly growing economies can be achieved without 
discriminatory trade policies and thus without impeding market access to non-
members. Under such circumstances, trade will not be diverted from the low-
cost source to the high-cost source because of unequal treatment. This is the 
message from the APEC figures as APEC did not pursue such policies during 
the first half of the nineties. APEC’s regionalization was market-driven and not 
policy-driven [Langhammer, 1995]. Secondly, deepening and widening 
regionalism (note the different wording) will not promote further trade diversion 
if two conditions are met. Internal dismantling of trade barriers is 
simultaneously accompanied by commitments and implementation toward trade 
liberalization vis-à-vis non-member countries. Furthermore, GDP growth 
differentials between the rest of the world and the integration scheme become 
larger. This is what happened in the EU in the early nineties. The EU has been 
acknowledged to have liberalized external trade further [WTO, TPRM, 1997] 
while driving forces for economic growth were weak. The latter point is 
supported by the observation that there was zero growth of real gross fixed 
capital formation in EU 1990-1995 contrasting to the US and developing Asia   7 
with annual growth rates of about 4 and 8 per cent, respectively [European 
Economy, No. 64, Table 20]. 
  To summarize the first common element between the EU and APEC, both 
groupings were the major stimulants of world trade in the early nineties. 
Somewhat counterintuitively, the EU did not expand intra-area trade as in the 
decade before while APEC did so. Therefore, as APEC did not pursue 
discriminatory trade policies, neither APEC nor the EU can be blamed to have 
expanded industrial trade to the detriment of third countries during this period.  
b.  Participation in reforming and strengthening the multilateral trading system 
Both the EU and the APEC economies have been the engines in concluding the 
Uruguay Round (UR). While the EU acted as a single entity, APEC economies 
practiced concerted unilateralism also in Geneva, however, with the major 
contribution from some APEC economies in the Cairns Group representing the 
interests of net exporters of agricultural products and with the most important 
single country effort of the US in negotiating the Blair House Agreement with 
the EU.  
  In terms of quantifiable commitments, both the EU and the APEC 
economies (excluding the not yet-WTO member China) reveal liberalization 
performances which stand up to a comparison with the rest of the world (Table 
2). The import-weighted APEC average of industrial tariff reduction amounted 
to 32 per cent which is the same rate achieved by a representative group of rest 
of world (ROW) countries. The EU-12 and EU-15 reduction is only slightly 
higher. This is remarkable as the APEC is not only influenced by the industrial 
countries’ strong compliance with GATT/WTO prescriptions but also by 
developing countries with traditional claims for special and differential 
treatment. The same assessment holds for the weight of imports subject to bound 
tariffs. Again, it is noteworthy that after the UR more than 80 per cent of imports 
of the APEC economies is subject to bound tariffs which brings a high degree to   8 
accountability and stability into internal liberalization endeavors of APEC. In 
this respect, the Bogor targets benefit from the Geneva commitments. For the 
EU, tariff binding is complete while the ROW is located between APEC and the 
EU. The most important superior achievement of both APEC and the EU 
compared to the ROW is in the importance of imports subject to zero tariffs. 
Here, the ROW (18 per cent) scores far below the two groupings’ rates of 52 per 
cent (APEC) and 38 per cent (EU). Yet, the merits of high shares of imports 
subject to zero tariffs are not unambiguous. Should zero tariffs be concentrated 
in input sectors while high tariffs are kept in downstream industries, tariff 
escalation within APEC could be high thus indicating high effective rates of 
protection and thus high discrimination between different stages of processing. 
Sectoral liberalization efforts (compared to across-the-board liberalization) 
could cement such discrepancies. This aspect is given further attention below. 
  Apart from quantifiable commitments, both the EU and APEC economies 
have supported the WTO in qualitative reforms, for instance, by complying with 
the dispute settlement mechanism and by contributing to transparency in new 
areas such as trade in services, TRIPs and TRIMS. They have also repeatedly 
expressed their interest in submitting further liberalization efforts to the WTO 
rules instead of negotiating bilaterally. This also holds for the Transatlantic 
Market Place Initiative between the US and the EU which would be embedded 
in the multilateral trading framework. In general, it is fair to say that it is the 
group of Asia-Pacific APEC members which has the lowest stake in preferential 
trading and highest stake in MFN-based trade among all major trading partners. 
Thus, supporters of the multilateral trading order can be expected to come 
primarily from this quarter.   9 
Table 2 – APEC and EU Commitments in the Uruguay Round 
  (1) (2) (3) 
APEC      
Australia  39 96 16 
Canada 47  100  39 
Japan  56 96 71 
New Zealand  50  100  43 
US 35  100  40 
Hong Kong  0  23  100 
Indonesia 0  92  2 
Korea, Rep.   54  89  26 
Malaysia  9 78 23 
Mexico 27  100  1 
Chile 29  100  0 
Philippines 6  67  0 
Singapore  0 73 46 









EU      
EU 12  37  100  38 
Austria 32  100  38 
Finland 31  100  35 
Sweden 33  100  34 
Import-weighted 







Rest of the World (ROW)      
Norway 44  100  65 
Switzerland 32  100  35 
South  Africa  30 99 21 
Argentina 19  100  0 
Brazil 34  100  5 
Columbia 20  100  0 
India  55 68 16 
Tunisia 0  32  1 
Turkey 11  39  3 









(1) = Percentage reduction of industrial tariffs. 
(2) = Share of bound imports in industrial imports (post UR conditions) 
(3) = Share of imports duty-free in industrial imports (post UR conditions) 
Source: Hoda [1994]. Own calculations.   10 
2. Challenges 
a.  Increasing heterogeneity through enlargement 
Both the EU and APEC are bicycles in motion. The EU faces the challenge of 
parallel deepening and widening of the integration process while APEC tries to 
sustain the momentum by encouraging member states to subscribe to ambitious 
targets (Bogor) and actions (Manila) adopted at the annual summit meetings. 
Ongoing motion, however, implies costs in terms of increasing heterogeneity 
and costs of compromising. In the EU, under constant membership, one might 
expect increasing heterogeneity to be kept under control. However, different 
speeds of implementation, for instance, in implementing Single Market 
commitments, can lead to higher heterogeneity even among the old member 
states. In APEC, economic and political heterogeneity (some would call it 
diversity) is the most important challenge and from the very beginning was 
accepted as such by stressing the principle of concerted unilateralism.  
  But beyond heterogeneity under constant membership, there is 
heterogeneity due to enlargement. While the EU has decided to enlarge the 
Union in eastern direction, APEC has decided to go both northwest (Russia) and 
southeast (Latin America). In both cases, poorer countries with higher levels of 
external protection and substantially different perceptions of a market economy 
join more advanced countries. For APEC being widely informal, it does not 
make much difference to have Russia and Colombia/Peru/Central American 
countries at the table provided that peer pressure can still continue to work. Yet, 
this is open to debate as countries accede which have not yet acted in a 
competitive spatial environment where partner countries see themselves as units 
competing for mobile resources. While east and southeast Asian countries 
clearly have developed this environment internally and with respect to the US 
also externally, this perception is probably weaker in Russia and Latin America. 
Hence, should peer pressure as a major force which drives the APEC bicycle   11 
become weaker, an enlarged APEC could be confronted to eventually establish 
stricter rules of checks and balances among a core group while allowing 
peripheral countries to go their own way. Hence, at the end, an explicit rule of 
„integration at different speeds“ could replace peer pressure and would make 
APEC even more „fluid“ than today.  
  The EU case is clearer. The gate to the EU will be opened fully only after 
the accession countries comply with the entire set of common legislation, rules 
and regulations which the EU calls the acquis communautaire. Hence, a long 
transition period is taken as a means to reduce heterogeneity somewhat. In spite 
of the smoothening role of transition periods (which APEC does not have), 
heterogeneity in terms of income disparities, differences in economic structures 
and world market orientation will rise in a similar way in which, for instance, 
the enlargement of ASEAN toward Indochina increases heterogeneity 
[Langhammer, 1997]. This gives rise to the question whether the EU with more 
than twenty members will still be capable to play music in a march style or 
whether it will gradually move to a medley style. Without prescribing 
conclusions, there is a case for arguing that a blend of elements of the APEC 
approach on the one hand, i.e. allowing new members to join quickly and thus 
stimulating reforms both in old and new member states, and of the EU approach 
on the other hand, i.e. giving candidates some pre-accession tasks, could be the 
optimal way to reduce some heterogeneities, at least those dealing with 
differences in commitments toward policy reforms.  
b.  More members, more plans, more policies 
Apart from heterogeneity, it is the sheer size of both groupings which will 
establish challenges. Both the EU and APEC are heading for exceeding the 
number of twenty and both seem to have difficulties to implement strong 
reforms unless the summit meetings initiate and endorse them. The result is that 
summit meetings become overloaded with both setting new targets and   12 
reviewing the state of implementation of the former ones. The price to be paid is 
less time of checks of coherence especially if at the same time heterogeneity 
increases. To an outsider looking at APEC, it appears that the rapidly rising 
number of acronyms standing for sets of measures and plans like OAA, MAPA, 
IAPs, CAPs, TILF, EVLS, ECOTECH mirrors the rising tendency of 
overloading the summit meetings not to speak of overloading the various 
Committees which are responsible for stock-taking and implementation. To an 
outsider looking at the EU, however, it appears that beyond targets toward the 
Economic Union, ambitious objectives spread beyond into the political field. 
Such political objectives must accept that it is still the old-fashioned trade policy 
which acts as a substitute for a common foreign policy which is still missing 
[Messerlin, 1997] and that it is this role which explains why the EU trade policy 
is so diverse and special toward individual countries. 
c.  From adoption to implementation 
Both groupings have learned the lesson that adopting plans and programs is far 
from implementation. This seems self-evident for APEC which leaves it to 
member states to announce liberalization programs unilaterally and implement 
them in accordance with their domestic rules [Yamazawa, 1998: 12]. Whether 
peer pressure will be sufficient to induce member states to submit liberalization 
programs at least as consistent as those of the neighbors and to compete with 
neighbors in terms of early implementation, is an open question. But it is also 
open whether a fully legalistic approach with national law subject to revision if 
this is required by European law (a quasi anti-APEC approach) can guarantee 
implementation on schedule. It is known that countries like Germany and Italy 
are far behind schedule to implement the Single Market measures which are to 
be implemented since 1992. Even if stock-taking (either done officially by the 
EU Commission or unofficially by PECC or Asian economic scholars) provides   13 
transparency on the state of implementation, both groupings seem to be bound to 
wait in patience for results to be delivered.  
d.  Susceptibility to asymmetric shocks 
Heterogeneity is a constitutional element of large integration schemes and thus 
can be anticipated and accounted for. When enlarging a scheme it is certain that 
heterogeneity increases since founding core members as a matter of fact share 
more common interests and mostly more similar economic structures than 
latecoming peripheral members. What is uncertain and therefore costly in terms 
of precautionary action is the likelihood of asymmetric shocks shaking a 
grouping. While heterogeneity in principle raises the likelihood of asymmetric 
shocks to be deeper than in a homogeneous scheme, it is not evident that the 
outbreak of such a shock is a result of increasing heterogeneity. Instead, the 
causes may often arise from outside the grouping, such as changes in commodity 
prices. 
  For different reasons, in the past asymmetric shocks have challenged both 
APEC and the EU in a similar way, that is undermining the credibility of 
continuing the integration plans as if nothing has happened. In the EU, the major 
recent asymmetric shock, the German reunification, produced a boom, real 
appreciation, massive inflows, a current account deficit and the fall 1992 crisis 
of the ERM. The shock was the strongest in Germany and its neighboring 
countries pegging to the DM and the weakest in the UK and the Mediterranean 
countries. As the pound crisis also triggered contagion effects in the 
Mediterranean candidates of the EMU, it casted doubts on the credibility of the 
EMU project. Now, with the third stage of the EMU project scheduled to start in 
1999, the risk of asymmetric shocks in the real economy has not become smaller 
since the speed of real convergence outside the core group is still slow. Nominal 
exchange rate changes as a buffer are no longer available and the burden to cope   14 
with asymmetric shocks rests on labor markets which are not (yet) flexible 
neither concerning migration nor with respect to prices. 
  In East Asia, the currency crises have swept over a number of APEC (and 
ASEAN) member states as if the groupings had never existed. At hindsight, it is 
no surprise that financial markets heavily discounted membership in APEC. The 
scheme has competence (better: builds up competence) only in current account 
transactions which were not at the roots of the crises. For capital account 
transactions, it does not make a difference whether a country belongs to APEC 
or not. But the risk cannot be excluded that the burden of current account 
stabilization within APEC primarily rests upon import squeeze of affected 
countries, at least in the short run. Such squeeze is not only a result of a massive 
decline of domestic absorption or a credit crunch but perhaps also a result of 
some policy action, for instance, to postpone trade liberalization in general or to 
insist on exempting sensitive sectors longer from liberalization schedules than 
initially announced. It is this risk of second-round effects of the crises which 
APEC in the aftermath of the crises has to face. 
e.  Pathfinder for WTO universality 
Both the EU and APEC members bear crucial responsibility for the stability and 
improvement of the multilateral trading system. One of the most stabilizing 
elements is universality, i.e. bringing all trading partners under the WTO 
discipline. Apart from few small countries, two large countries are still left out, 
Russia and China. While Russia may geographically or strategically adhere to 
APEC, it is economically linked much more strongly to Europe than to Asia. If 
the intensity of bilateral trade links can be accepted as a proxy for the degree of 
trade policy frictions, then it is the EU which bears special capabilities to act as 
a pathfinder in bringing Russia into the WTO. Such capabilities also exist under 
the current status of Russia as an accession candidate. A positive stance of the   15 
EU can strongly help to shorten the time which is needed for Russia to accede to 
the WTO. 
  With respect to China, being even a member of APEC and economically 
most strongly integrated into the APEC region, it is clearly within the 
competence of APEC member states to accelerate the accession process which 
runs since 1986. To the non-APEC world, APEC would strongly gain in 
reputation if a summit meeting would signal green light for China’s WTO 
membership. Such signal would certainly pave the way for China into the WTO. 
III.  Differences in the Trade Liberalization Targeting and Implementing 
Between APEC and the EU 
Possible lessons from EU trade facilitation and liberalization have to accept a 
number of crucial differences in targets, constraints and means between the EU 
and APEC. Such differences can be briefly stylized as follows: 
1. Synchronised  Regional Versus Concerted Unilateral Trade Facilitation and 
Liberalization 
The EU operates a common trade policy toward non-members and further 
facilitates trade among member states following uniform rules. This happens, for 
instance, by gradually lifting ad personam quotas in border trade of specific 
consumption goods (tobacco, spirits) which are still subject to different excise 
taxes in EU member states and the control of which requires checks at inner 
borders. For APEC member states, there is no difference between internal and 
external trade policies since trade facilitation and liberalization are not restricted 
to APEC members. Thus, the only umbrella is the commitment to focus 
liberalization on commonly selected sectors in order to meet the Bogor deadlines 
on the years 2010 and 2020.  
  Given the non-existence of common actions (or even policies) against 
non-APEC members, APEC members operate purely MFN-based. The EU,   16 
however, as mentioned above, operate trade policies in the broader context of 
external relations being a substitute for a future common foreign and security 
policy. As such policies are per se discriminatory, it is the EU which can be 
made responsible for what is called the hub and spoke system which liberalizes 
trade between the hub and the spoke without necessarily liberalizing trade 
between the spokes and with other hubs (such as the US). 
2.  Across the Board Liberalization Versus Sectorally Differentiated 
Liberalization 
With the general exception of agriculture and few manufactures (cars, textiles), 
EU internal liberalization has been based and is still based on the „across the 
board“ principle, i.e. liberalizing all sectors along a common formula. This 
principle also seems to be the departure point of an EU proposal to proceed in a 
next multilateral trade negotiations round. The advantage is well-known; 
nominal rates of protection decrease jointly with effective rates and no rent-
seeking of sectors for special treatment is encouraged. 
  APEC (and also AFTA) proceeds differently. Their members agree on 
sectoral liberalization by selecting a number of priority sectors. Dee, Hardin and 
Schuele [1998] partly find the expected outcome of sectoral liberalization in the 
APEC Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSLs) proposals following the 
Subic Bay Summit in November 1996: some initiatives concentrate on upstream 
input sectors with low or moderate protection while the highly protected 
downstream industries are left out. As a result, the authors find significant 
second-best welfare losses. However, they also acknowledge that some 
initiatives have a broader coverage. Yet, in general, the early experience with 
EVSL initiatives tends to support the concerns that too much flexibility allowing 
individual APEC member states to opt for the least sensitive sectors as early 
liberalization candidates brings much less allocative gains than could be 
otherwise collected.    17 
3.  The Rule of Law Versus Peer Pressure 
EU-internal liberalization of goods and service trade and factor movements is 
the overriding principle underlying the EU Treaty. Interventions into free trade 
within the EU are subject to painstaking inquiries and are accepted only in 
exceptional cases of negative consumer externalities, i.e. in the BSE („mad cow 
disease“) case and the subsequent import ban on British beef or in containing the 
trade consequences of national differences in the legal handling of consumption 
of soft drugs. But even in these cases, interventions are very porous as personal 
belongings of individuals moving across the borders within the EU are usually 
not checked, neither within „Schengenland“ nor outside. The principle of free 
trade now spreads into the remnants of national sovereignty, such as public 
health services. Access to the cheapest source of medical treatment including 
hardware (like spectacles and artificial teeth) has been opened thus bringing 
domestic providers of such services under European-wide competition. The 
European Court of Justice oversees the principle of free internal trade and by 
decision-taking binds national legislation irreversibly. The conditions for 
external trade liberalization are not as legally settled as for internal trade except 
for the sole competence of the EU Commission in external trade negotiations 
concerning border transactions (such as tariffs and tariff-equivalent NTBs) and 
the joint competence of the Commission and national authorities in some 
„behind the border“ domestic measures such as TRIPs. But as concerns the 
external negotiations, again it is solely the Commission representing the Union 
even when there is joint competence. However, while the Commission 
negotiates, it remains with the Ministerial Council to endorse and adopt the 
results of negotiations. 
  Given the legalistic nature of orchestrating trade liberalization within the 
EU negotiations, there are sanctions against non-compliance which „bite“ in 
terms of penalties. There is nothing comparable in APEC. Instead of formal   18 
sanctions, there is peer pressure or moral persuasion to participate in 
liberalization offers or plans adopted during the summit meetings. There is no 
difference between internal and external trade liberalization. Nor is there a 
common negotiation platform vis-à-vis non-APEC states. What is common to 
the EU and APEC is asymmetric external liberalization between manufactures 
and agriculture. Those APEC members regarding their agricultural sector as 
non-competitive are not urged by other member states to liberalize this sector 
first. Likewise in the EU, EU member states with stakes in a domestic 
agricultural sector which seems less competitive under world market prices have 
always succeeded in urging upon the Commission that these sectors should be 
given more time before they open up to international competition. EU member 
states with an internationally competitive agricultural sector failed to convince 
other member states in arguing that continuing to protect the agricultural sector 
impeded structural change and growth in the Community. 
4.  Beyond Tariffs: Trade Facilitation APEC Style versus Removal of Barriers 
EU Style 
Trade facilitation within APEC rests on two plans, the country-specific so-called 
Individual Plan of Actions (IAPs) adopted in 1996 and the Collective Action 
Plans designed in the 1995 Osaka Action Agenda as common guidelines to 
orchestrate individual procedures. As these plans go beyond tariffs and include 
NTMs, services, investment, standards, customs procedures, intellectual 
property rights, competition policy, government procurement, deregulation, 
rules of origin, dispute mediation and mobility of business people, one could 
argue that the issue coverage comes close that of the EU which had all these 
issues in its Single Market Program. Yet, there is a crucial difference concerning 
intra-area trade. The IAPs are intended to provide transparency on trade barriers 
which are to be removed (positive list) but fail to bridge the gap in information 
between this list and the remaining barriers. A panel type of qualitative   19 
assessment of individual country commitments such as that of Yamazawa [1998] 
is necessarily conditioned by some degree of value judgment as concerns the 
deviation of commitments from the Bogor targets. However, it arrives at the 
acceptable conclusion that differences between APEC member states are large 
and systematically show the advanced member states (following the UR 
commitments) ahead of the less advanced member states. But again, one must 
stress that these are commitments only. As concern internal trade, the EU is far 
ahead. Many of the issues mentioned above are already under Brussels rule (for 
instance, competition policy) and in many cases barriers against maintaining 
trade restrictions were removed. For instance, in liberalizing internal air 
transport, the so-called „double disapproval principle“ states that tariffs fixed on 
a specific route become effective unless disapproved by both governments. 
Under this principle, a single government is no longer capable to protect its flag 
carrier against EU-internal competition. When the freedom of establishment was 
achieved thus abandoning the exclusive rights of state-owned flag carriers , this 
was the stepping stone to free movement of services with full cabotage   
introduced in 1997. One could easily extend this example to other areas and they 
all yield the same result: EU directives specified what was generally laid out in 
the Treaty as the four freedoms (goods and services, establishment, capital and 
movement of persons) and developed principles and rules to open up formerly 
segmented markets and to set deadlines for meeting the commitments. 
  As concerns external trade liberalization, however, many EU offers in the 
WTO, for instance, in services, still come close to the transparency and „positive 
list“ procedure. It is for this reason why the EU way of liberalizing new areas 
such as services has been seen as a helpful pathfinder for multilateral 
negotiations.   20 
5.  Free Movements of Persons: APEC’s Limited Scope Versus EU’s Full Scope 
Mobility of people is an essential element of market integration. People are 
carriers of goods, business and consumer services  and knowledge and can 
effectively tear down policy-induced barriers to trade by carrying these assets 
with them. APEC’s approach is strictly limited to enhancing the short term 
mobility of the business community traveling within APEC for trade and 
investment. It goes without saying that this objective excludes migration of 
construction workers, for instance. Given the enormous differences in unskilled 
labor endowment within APEC, one could argue that labor mobility will be the 
last area to be liberalized and that micro- and macroeconomic costs of mobility 
are much lower if capital moves to labor than if labor moves to capital. But even 
within more homogenous regional sub-groupings such as ASEAN and NAFTA, 
free movement of non-business people is the last point on the integration agenda 
knowing that the degree of migration inertia has been traditionally lower for 
unskilled people in Asia than outside Asia (though probably still  higher than for 
skilled people). That means that any policy measure toward freer movement of 
people is feared to trigger large migration flows which are seen unacceptable for 
political reasons.  
  For a long time, Europe had been in a more comfortable position. People-
specific impediments to cross-border movement for commercial reasons were 
relatively large since labor endowment and employment opportunities were 
similar in Western European countries. The reservoir of unskilled people ready 
to migrate at any cost was small and „push“ motives (motives which are 
exclusively rooted in conditions of the sending country such as distress 
migration) were irrelevant. Policy regulations such as mutual recognition of 
school grades and diplomas were strict and thus, in spite of the early enough 
adopted principle of free mobility of people, weakened the „pull“ motives (the 
attractiveness of the receiving country). Today, migration within western Europe   21 
outside border regions is still small though „pull“ motives become more 
important. Yet, similarities to APEC have increased with the pre-accession 
agreements of the EU with the much more unskilled labor-abundant Central and 
Eastern European countries. However, mobility of people from these countries 
has not been confined to business people but has early enough allowed migrant 
unskilled labor (subject to country quotas) to work temporarily in EU member 
states. In this respect, the EU has responded more offensively to the labor 
endowment differentials between the EU and the accession candidates than 
APEC in which this differential was huge from the very beginning.  
6.  APEC’s Tacid Understanding of Non-Intervention into Domestic Policies 
Versus EU Move to a Common Foreign and  Security Policy via Commercial 
Policies 
It seems trivial to point to the entirely economic nature of APEC cooperation. 
The principle of non-intervention into domestic policies is vital to APEC’s 
sustainability and is strictly maintained in order to keep disagreement, for 
instance, on boundary issues or human rights, within politically manageable 
dimensions. The EU approach has been different from the very first decade 
onward. Political cooperation was always conceived as a prime target to be 
approached via economic integration and, as mentioned above, trade policies 
toward non-member countries still act as a substitute to a common foreign 
policy. This long-term objective of intensified political cooperation between 
nations has always influenced trade policies in the way that compromises 
between more and less world market-oriented partner countries became easier. 
In other words, for the sake of not endangering the long-term objectives, 
agreements on common positions and policies have always been facilitated. This 
was most clearly shown in the final stage of the UR when French opposition 
against some elements of liberalizing trade in agriculture in the aftermath of the 
Blair House Agreement was removed by the other member states by endorsing 
French claims in other issues (anti-dumping). In general, the overriding principle   22 
not to violate political cooperation has sometimes weakened the liberal position 
of the EU toward non-members and has tied the hands of those member states 
which would have been prepared to accelerate EU market opening.  
  An observer’s view on APEC is that collective action in economic 
cooperation would be facilitated if there were broad common visions of 
principles of political cooperation. As they do not exist, the power for the APEC 
bicycle must be entirely generated from the economic benefits which individual 
APEC countries derive from their membership and from the spillovers which a 
critical mass of bundled individual countries’ advantages creates for the 
„laggers“ within APEC. Such power can easily evaporate if asymmetric shocks 
such as the current currency crises in Asia Pacific drive a wedge into APEC and 
reduce the critical mass of liberalization „leaders“. 
IV.  Framework Conditions Determining Trade Liberalization APEC Style 
and their Implications 
1.  Open Regionalism: The Flip Coin Problem 
The principles of openness and non-discrimination are APEC’s brandmark. So is 
the regional label „Asia-Pacific“ which in order to remain meaningful implies 
clarification on who is seen as (actual or potential) member of the region and 
who belongs to other regions. APEC has always sought to maintain the 
liberalization momentum by keeping the principles flexible and defining Asia-
Pacific widely in terms of the entire Pacific Rim which would include Russia 
and those Latin American countries bordering the Pacific. In addition, the scope 
of issues has been opened from traditional trade liberalization to trade 
facilitation including alleviation of factor movements related to trade in goods 
and services.  
  This flexibility and openness brings APEC close to quasi-multilateralism 
and a semi-WTO from which the EU (as the major non-APEC grouping left) is   23 
excluded because of the tyranny of geography. With both widening country 
coverage and scope of issues, APEC is called to define its genuine role vis-à-vis 
the multilateral trading system which shares the same principles (non-
discrimination and wide scope of issues) but is stronger in implementation 
because it enjoys the advantages of contractional arrangements and 
commitments. Openness in its extreme form can go hand in hand with 
uncontained heterogeneity, sub-optimal informality and loss of track keeping. 
Should this development proceed, APEC members can be tempted to see the 
grouping only as a long-winded way to a Millennium Round in Geneva and to 
ask how large the value added is not to go this way directly but to pass via 
APEC. Increasing overlap and substitutability with the more powerful 
contractual multilateralism under the WTO is APEC’s flip coin of utmost 
flexibility and openness. Being successful in this respect could make APEC 
ultimately redundant while it could be applauded for having protected the 
multilateral system against closed regionalism and aggressive bilateralism. 
2.  APEC in the Era of Sky-Rocketing Capital Account Transactions 
APEC has been founded as a vehicle for trade facilitation within the Asian-
Pacific Rim. As a result, APEC instruments, measures and procedures 
concentrate on reducing transaction costs in the current account. Though rising 
current account transactions find their counterpart in rising capital account 
transactions as concerns financing of trade flows repatriating investment 
income, this is not the major root of sky-rocketing capital account transactions 
in recent years. Instead, the latter transactions are autonomous in the sense that 
they are widely delinked from the current account and are geared to finance 
investment. Due to lacking monetary integration in APEC, the fruits of trade 
facilitation can easily become overshadowed by turbulences in financial markets 
and perhaps be made ineffective. This holds as market imperfections and 
negative spillovers have proven to impact more strongly on capital account   24 
transactions than on current account transactions. In the course of the currency 
crises, APEC had to learn the lesson that its focus on the current account did not 
induce financial markets to believe that it would be risky to launch speculative 
attacks against the currencies of individual APEC member states. It is not likely 
that either a wider issue coverage and/or a wider country coverage in current 
account liberalization will help APEC to impress financial markets more 
strongly than in the past. 
3.  APEC and the Asian Economic Recession 
Since its foundation, APEC has never been more seriously challenged by a 
spread of recessionary trends than in 1998. It seems that the burden of balance of 
payments stabilization in debt-ridden Asian economies in the short run will have 
to be shouldered mainly by declining import demand thus affecting other APEC 
member states which badly need foreign exchange revenues from exports. Past 
intensification of intra-area trade thus takes a heavy toll and puts strains upon 
the „business as usual“ continuation of accomplishing the Bogor targets. So do 
competing supply structures of East Asian economies in third markets after 
competitive devaluations. In addition to strains among East Asian developing 
economies, a growing trade surplus of Japan vis-à-vis the North American 
APEC members could give rise to the re-emergence of trade policy conflicts 
across the Pacific. Hence, there are at least three possible sources of stress 
among APEC member states. 
  In this situation, APEC is handicapped in arresting trade-restrictive 
measures by the informality of trade facilitation offers which can easily be 
postponed or withdrawn.  
4.  APEC Facing Asymmetric Shocks 
Experiences with currency crises suggest adjustment periods to take more than 
two years if new institutional arrangements, for instance, in financial markets are   25 
needed. However, even if the recession will be managed, the likelihood of 
asymmetric shocks departing from the capital account and no longer solely from 
the current account (such as the ‘Dutch disease’ phenomenon) can plague APEC 
for a longer period. This likelihood might call either for intra-APEC bail-out 
arrangements which might be rated non-credible by financial markets. 
Alternatively, APEC could signal its understanding of fighting asymmetric 
shocks by accelerating trade facilitation in sectors which are close to financial 
transactions, for instance, liberalization of trade in financial services. Again, as 
mentioned above more generally, APEC must then define its genuine role vis-à-
vis the WTO arrangement for financial services coming into force in 1999.  
5.  APEC and the Millennium Round 
One of the external framework conditions facing APEC is the endeavor of major 
trading partners to keep the WTO bicycle in motion beyond the mere 
implementation of UR commitments. The appropriate way of maintaining the 
momentum of world-wide trade liberalization is launching a new multilateral 
round, the Millennium Round. Signals in this direction have been sent by the EU 
Commission which, however, apart from few sensitive sectors like agriculture 
and audio-visual services, seems to prefer an „across the board“ liberalization 
approach. This contrasts with the sectoral approach which is preferred by APEC 
and which since 1994 has also been pursued in the WTO (see information 
technology agreement). As APEC follows open regionalism, its stance toward 
the „across the board“ approach and toward the requirement of reciprocity is 
important both for the progress in intra-APEC trade facilitation and for 
introducing this progress into the multilateral negotiations.  
  A compromise between the two approaches could be a flat rate of 
liberalization across the board followed by sectoral liberalization mark ups 
provided that a critical mass of non-APEC countries are prepared to liberalize 
specific sectors more than the flat rate.   26 
V.  Trade Liberalization EU-Style: What is Worth to be Taken into 
Consideration by APEC? 
EU is certainly a widely different arrangement compared to APEC. Hence, any 
operational details of liberalization aiming at the customs union, the Single 
Market or even the economic union cannot be considered by APEC as it does 
not envisage these stages of economic integration before the Bogor targets are 
met. Possible lessons from forty years of EU integration can therefore be only 
taken from the institutional toolbox of rule-making and the operational level of 
the free trade area which unlike in the fifties today includes elements of free 
capital movements. 
1.  Anchoring Principles and Procedures in Liberalization Timetables 
Internal trade liberalization focusing on the removal of border barriers can easily 
be made obsolete if domestic „behind the border“ measures remain untackled. 
As a result of substantial unilateral and multilateral cuts of border barriers in the 
past, domestic measures such as subsidies and regulations discriminating against 
foreign suppliers have become the true barriers to trade. This holds for APEC 
and for the EU. Instead of dealing with each issue separately, the EU has 
anchored principles and procedures in various layers of legislation. In the area of 
trade, the most important principle is that of mutual recognition based on the 
country of origin. Translated into the APEC context, this would mean that 
products (including services) which have been orderly marketed (without 
violating consumers’ welfare) in a member state, could be supplied under the 
home country regulation in other APEC member states. This is a powerful 
defence against bureaucratic preferences for ex ante harmonization. In the 
second banking directive of 1989, the EU has applied this principle to cross-
border supply of banking services. It is this sector which is of particular 
relevance to APEC in the current crisis since applying the home country   27 
principle to the financial sector would initiate a healthy competition between 
different prudential standards of APEC countries. 
  However, given the MFN nature of all APEC liberalization measures, one 
may ask why this principle should be limited to APEC member states and not be 
extended to the EU provided that the EU applies the same principle to APEC. 
  Another more operational procedure in the EU which has been 
instrumental to stimulate competition is the so-called ‘double disapproval rule’ 
mentioned above in the context of liberalizing internal air traffic. If the majority 
of APEC member states wanted to augment peer pressure upon member states 
lagging in liberalization and if in the past freer trade was impeded by bilateral 
regulations (for instance, landing rights, fares), it can confirm this rule at a 
summit meeting. An individual member state would then no longer be capable to 
postpone liberalization against the requests of other member states to facilitate 
market access. 
2.  Monitoring and Transparency 
The EU regularly publishes reports on the state of liberalization for various 
issues (interestingly enough, however, not for trade where it is the WTO Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) which pursues this task. The motive is to 
provide transparency and to enhance peer pressure where the Commission has 
no legal means to file cases. Such monitoring could take a similar two-step 
procedure as in the TPRM: the Secretariat reports on the state and the member 
state responds. Both, response and the minutes of the discussion, are integrated 
into a final report which is released for publication. 
  Monitoring and transparency is facilitated if targets are articulated for 
shorter periods and for precise sub-issues. In this respect, the Bogor targets seem 
fairly broad and vision-like rather than operational. The EU Single Market target   28 
(1985-92) was agreed upon for half the timespan needed to arrive at free trade 
among the advanced APEC member states.  
  Finally, the maximum of activities is often not the optimum especially if 
the capacities of implementation are weak. APEC obviously seems to need a 
new program, action plan or target for each summit meeting to keep the bicycle 
in motion. Apart from confusing overlaps and duplications, this can create 
credibility deficits and problems of time inconsistency since observers are aware 
of the weak implementation and enforcement capacities in the APEC medley 
orchestra. As in the EU where implementing the Single Market program formed 
the core issue of each summit during 1985 and 1992, the Bogor targets should 
be monitored as each year in order to enable the summit participants to take 
stock and keep track. Individual exporters could be invited to contribute to a 
databank on trade barriers in APEC economies. This databank could be installed 
and up-dated by the APEC Secretariat in a way the EU Commission operates a 
„market access“ databank (available in Internet) reporting on trade policy 
measures in trading partner countries. 
3.  Trade Liberalization and Development Level 
In liberalizing internal trade, the EU has never differentiated between member 
states at different levels of development. Instead, such differences were tackled 
by payments from structural fonds. Hence, allocation targets were separated 
from distributional targets in order to prevent the infant industry argument from 
influencing integration policies. APEC, however, has followed the GATT (Art. 
18 and Part IV, 1979, Enabling Clause) and has given developing partner 
countries more time to dismantle trade barriers than developed partner countries. 
This distinction creates vested interests and path dependency as the status of 
„being in the state of development“ is fixed according to questionable criteria 
and is unlikely to be changed. It can lead to liberalization inertia and rent-
seeking for maintaining the development status.   29 
  What holds for countries, holds for sectors, too. Apart from the 
agricultural sector which is far from being a liberal showcase in APEC as well 
as in the EU, APEC prefers sectorally differentiated liberalization tracks in the 
industry sector which, as argued above, can provoke a number of allocative 
distortions plus rent-seeking. The EU „across the board“ liberalization approach 
might be less effective in the beginning but seems more effective at the end 
when rent-seekers want to test the steadiness of governments against pressures 
for delaying the deadline for opening the market.  
4. Improving  Accountability 
The EU operates a system of presidency which semi-annually rotates from 
country to country. In addition, a Troika consisting of the country holding the 
presidency „on duty“ plus the successor and predecessor country of presidency 
represents the Community in all international affairs. It is less clear what the role 
of the APEC summit host is as concerns the medium-term perspective of APEC. 
While the APEC procedure of an annual summit meeting seems to place more 
workload upon the interim-work of Committees and the APEC Secretariat, the 
accountability of the operational level is weaker than it would be under a Troika 
system. Peer pressure and continuity could be enhanced if a rotating APEC 
Troika would be officially charged to oversee the work of the Secretariat and 
convey stock-taking results on „how far are APEC economies from the Bogor 
targets“ to the public. Accountability could be further improved if the Troika 
were allowed to address legislative bodies of member countries.  
  Such proposals are necessarily EU-biased and probably beyond the 
informal nature of APEC. Yet, in order to give peer pressure „teeth“ in bad-
weather times such as a recession, an institutional strengthening of the Heads of 
State level (including their ministries) could be fruitful in terms of giving the 
Bogor targets true identity and ownership in APEC member states.   30 
5.  Representing APEC in the WTO 
Unlike the EU which commands full control over all policies related to trade and 
is therefore a legitimate representative of the individual member states as 
Contracting Parties, APEC is not in this position. However, given the proximity 
of the APEC „open regionalism“ concept to the MFN principle, it could be 
advisable to find common guidelines for negotiations with the EU (and other 
non-APEC Contracting Parties) under the auspices of a new multilateral round. 
The Cairns Group of the UR as an ad hoc group could be taken as the model for 
an APEC Group which as a precondition, however, has to build up commonly 
accepted positions to be represented outside APEC. The question who should 
present APEC in Geneva again points to the important prerequisite of 
strengthening the accountability of APEC. Inviting the EU to an APEC summit 
for presenting the EU view toward a Millennium Round could also be helpful to 
gain a maximum of transparency on each others position before negotiations 
officially start.  
6.  Learning from the EU Way of Handling Currency Crises? 
EU’s second major project (following the Single Market), the Monetary Union, 
suggests lessons to be drawn from the pre-stage, the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) for supporting APEC members against attacks on their 
currencies. This issue has been dealt with in more detail in Langhammer [1998]. 
To summarize the findings, it is argued that neither the examples of the old 1950 
European Payments Union nor the experiences with the anchor currency role of 
the Deutschmark are transferable to APEC. The reasons are first the stronger 
likelihood of asymmetric shocks resulting from the current account (‘Dutch 
disease’ problems) and the capital account. The emergence of asymmetric 
shocks, however, are open invitations to financial markets to test the credibility 
of exchange rate binding. Heterogeneity in EU 15 is much smaller than in APEC 
18. This is witnessed, for instance, by the lack of commodity exporters inside   31 
the EU. Second, no Asian currency is prepared to take the anchor currency role 
so that even a sub-APEC monetary arrangement is not credible. In the APEC-
wide context, the long-standing use of the dollar as a nominal external anchor 
became unsustainable given the mismatch between dollar borrowing and credit 
allocation in the domestic economy under conditions of asset bubbles and 
collapsing exchange rate pegging. Third, binding APEC currencies together 
would put more strain upon APEC labor markets as an adjustment buffer to 
asymmetric shocks. While APEC labor markets are relatively flexible internally, 
they are not flexible among APEC member states for economic and political 
reasons. 
  Hence, a stress-free implementation of the EMU project requires a long 
pre-stage of goods and factor market integration which comes close to the level 
of integration in a domestic market. Even in the EU, there are good reasons to 
assume that such integration has not yet been achieved and that the so-called 
coronation theory (the monetary union being the coronation of goods and factor 
market integration) is well-founded. APEC and sub-groups of APEC are far 
from meeting this requirement.  
VI. Concluding  Remarks 
The preceding sections have shown that APEC and the EU have started 
regionalism from very different historical, economic and political legacies. 
Against these legacies, „open regionalism“ and the step-by-step approach of 
deepening institutionalized regionalism have been logical follow-ups. The 
essential difference between the two approaches is the degree to which national 
policies and policy maneuvering are bound. The APEC principle of peer 
pressure stands for non-binding in the legal sense whereas the EU principles of 
supranational contracts and surrendering national sovereignty stands for strong 
binding. In the words of music, the medley with its variability of themes meets 
the march with its clear beat.   32 
  An outlook for the future has to answer the question whether the two 
approaches will converge or diverge. My presumption is that they will converge 
for three major reasons. 
First, EU integration widening brings lower-income countries with very 
different economic structures into the Community which eventually will lead to 
integration at different speeds (the so-called concentric circles assumption). 
Thus, playing a march with more than twenty members many of them pure 
amateurs now joining an orchestra of professionals sounds differently compared 
to the small orchestra of the seventies and eighties. At the same time, APEC will 
have to streamline the peer pressure approach somewhat in order to remain 
credible and to maintain the liberalization momentum. The first streamlining 
was targeting regional free trade for 2010/2020. Further streamlining could 
include a focusing of liberalization ranges (in terms of more specified tariff rate 
reduction corridors) as was done by AFTA. Thus, even a medley can be nailed 
down to a clear theme.  
  Secondly, the two schemes will have to further reconcile their approaches 
with the multilateral system. For APEC, this is an easy task since open 
regionalism like multilateralism is non-discriminatory. There is not a large gap 
between the two principles. As concerns the EU, recent WTO decisions against 
the EU such as the banana case as well as the general issue of compatibility of 
EU-third country trade agreements with Art. 24 GATT show that the EU will 
have to submit all measures (including agriculture, textiles, cars and the special 
external relations like the Lomé Convention) under WTO discipline. That means 
that the all-embracing WTO umbrella will induce a convergence between APEC 
and EU principles  
  Thirdly, the role of the nation state has to be revised in the era of 
globalization. Formerly non-tradables become tradable. People and taxe bases 
become more mobile and country border become increasingly porous. There are   33 
two likely developments arising from these trends. Issues with cross-border 
spillovers will be increasingly dealt with on a multilateral level (environment, 
labor standards). On the other hand, investment in spatially limited services like 
education and physical infrastructure are likely to be financed increasingly on a 
lower level than countries, i.e. sub-regions, municipalities, states within a 
country [Tanzi, 1998]. In future, citizens will be more prepared to pay local 
authorities taxes for public services where they are produced instead of paying 
national authorities taxes simply for receiving a passport and for being protected 
against external threats. In short, the beauty contest for mobile resources will be 
decided more between sub-national entities than between nations. Such entities 
can also comprise border areas of different countries such as the well-known 
growth triangles in Southeast Asia. Under this process, the EU internal 
allocation of resources will no longer be decided alone between countries but 
between sub-regions and their immobile factors. It is this diffusion of borders 
which at the end might shift the EU toward a degree of diversity and 
heterogeneity which APEC had from the very beginning.   34 
Bibliography 
 
Dee, Philippa, Alexis Hardin, Michael Schuele (1998). APEC Early Voluntary 
Sectoral Liberalization, Paper presented at the 4th APEC Roundtable 
Regional Cooperation and Asian Recovery. Brandeis University and Keio 
University, ISEAS and KIEP, 26-27 May 1998, Boston/ Mass. 
European Economy (1997). Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. The Outcome 
of the Amsterdam European Council on Stability, Growth and 
Employment, (EU Commisssion: Brussels) No. 64.  
Garnaut, Ross (1996). Open Regionalism and Trade Liberalisation (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies): 7. 
Hoda, Anwarul (1994). Trade Liberalisation. In: OECD: The New World 
Trading System: Readings (Paris: OECD): 41-56. 
Langhammer, Rolf J. (1995). Regional Integration in East Asia. From Market-
Driven Regionalisation to Institutionalised Regionalism? 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 131: 167-201. 
Langhammer, Rolf J. (1997). How Far Is Indochina from ASEAN? ASEAN 
Economic Bulletin, 14: 159-175.  
Langhammer, Rolf J. (1998a). Europe’s Trade, Investment and Strategic Policy 
Interests in Asia and APEC. In: Peter Drysdale and David Vines (Eds), 
Europe, East Asia and APEC. A Shared Global Agenda? (Cambridge: 
CUP): 223-253. 
Langhammer, Rolf J. (1998b). The Asian Currency Crisis Seen from Europe: 
Can Newly Emerging Europe Help Newly Declining Asia? Paper presented 
at the 4th APEC Roundtable Regional Cooperation and Asian Recovery. 
Brandeis University and Keio University, ISEAS and KIEP, 26-27 May 
1998, Boston/Mass. 
Messerlin, Patrick A. (1997). MFN-Based Freer Trade and Regional Free Trade: 
What Role for the European Community? Netherlands Economic Institute, 
Rotterdam, EU/LDC News, Vol. 4, No. 3: 1-11. 
Sapir, André (1992). Regional Integration in Europe. Economic Journal, 102: 
1491-1506. 
Tanzi, Vito (1998). The Demise of the Nation State. Paper presented at the Kiel 
Week Conference Globalization and Labor, 24-25 June, Kiel Institute of 
World Economics, Kiel. 
World Trade Organization (1995). Regionalism and the World Trading System, 
Geneva.    35 
WTO/TPRM (1997). Trade Policy Review European Union. Report by the 
Secretariat. WT/TPR/S/30, 20 October 1997, mimeo. 
Yamazawa, Ippei (1998). APEC’s Progress Toward the Bogor Target: A 
Quantitative Assessement of 1997 IAP/CAP. In Collaboration with IAP 
Study Group, PECC Japan Committee, Tokyo: PECC, March.  
 